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California is at the forefront ofa conservative
wave throughout the country to limit the size of
government. Although California is somewhat
unique in that its voters' efforts so far have been
directed mostly at reducing property taxes, na-
tionwide grassroots efforts to restrict govern-
ment spending and taxes have since gained
momentum in at least half of the 50 states.
Like many states, California has an initiative
process by which voters can petition to place
constitutional amendments directiy on the state
ballot. When the Assembly failed to enact pro-
perty tax relief in 1977, a number of tax protes-
tors began to circulate tax-limitation petitions,
with most of them uniting behind a proposal
developed by Howard larvis and Paul Gann
which called for a dramatic decrease in (and a
permanent restriction on) property taxes. By
December 29, 1977, the Jarvis-Gann Amend-
menthad gained the needed signatures to qualify
as Proposition 13 onthelune 1978 state-primary
ballot. On lune 6, the measure passed by an
overwhelming 2-to-l majority.
Proposition I3 restricts revenue sources, and
hence, decreases the expected future income
stream oflocal governments and specialdistricts
in California. It also restricts increases in the
state's taxing powers, thereby blocking large
increases in statetaxes asanalternative source of
government revenue. Since such restrictions
should ,affect the ability of municipalitiesIto
serviCe and retire debt, Proposition 13's passage
may adversely affect both the cost of new issues
and the value of existing California municipal
debt.
Proposition 13 and similar measures that are
now sweeping the country may have an import-
ant impact on the cost and value of municipal
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debt. Hence, they have important implications
for present and potential holders of municipal
debt, for policymakers at all levels of govern-
ment, and for voters who wish to consider
possible side effects ofalternative waystoreduce
the size of government. This article shows that
Proposition 13 affects particularkinds ofmunic-
ipal debt in different ways because ofthespecific
wording of the amendment. For example, debt
secured solely by property-taxrevenues is severe-
ly affected, while other kinds of debt backed by
general taxrevenues are affected less ornot atall.
It is concluded, therefore, thatrestrictions onthe
size of government need not have dramatic
effects on the cost or value ofgovernment debt.
However, if such restrictions are applied only to
certain sources of revenue, they may have large
and unintended side effects.
This study examines what has happened to
new-issue interestcosts for different categoriesof
California municipal bonds since Proposition 13
was placed on the ballot at the end of1977. Data
rarely exist for secondary-market yields because
of the thinness ofthe market, so the interest cost
for new issues is used here to represent the yield
on existing debt. In this manner, the study also
provides estimates of the effects of Proposition
13 on the value ofoutstandingdebt. In Section I,
Proposition 13 is described and hypotheses are
presented concerning its effects on eachcategory
of bond. In Section II an econometric model is
developed toexplain statisticallytheinterestcost
of new issues. The model is estimated for each
category ofbond, and anestimateis obtained for
the overall effect ofProposition 13 as well as for
the individual effects ofchanges in bond ratings
and other explanatory factors. In Section III,
inferences are drawn regarding the adverse ef-
fects on the value of outstanding California
municipal debt. In the final section thesummary
and conclusions are presented.I. Probable Effects of Proposition 13 on California Municipal Debt
Factors that affect default risk vary widely for
municipal bonds, depending principally oneach
bond's security-that is, the legal and economic
constraints affecting the cash flow available for
debt service and retirement. At one extreme, a
pure revenue bond is secured solely by the
revenue generated from the financed project,
such as a parking lot. For such a bond, the cash
flow ofthe project, and hence the security ofthe
bond, is completely independent ofthecashflow
of the issuing municipality. Thus, the risk ofthe
bond depends solely on the risk of the project,
and not on the general condition of the govern-
ment. At the other extreme, a general-obligation
bond is secured by the general cash flow of the
issuing government, and thus is not tied to a
specific project or revenue source. Thus, risk ofa
general-obligation bond depends on the solvency
of the issuing government.
There are many variations of municipal
bonds, as we see below. In analyzing the risk ofa
particular bond, one looks first at the legal
provisions for the bond's repayment and second
at the economic prospects involved. Since Prop-
osition 13 reduces revenues from property taxes
and generally attempts torestricttaxincreasesat
the state-and-local level, it should affect debt
whose security is limited principally to property-
tax revenue. It might also affect debt whose
security depends on the overall cash flow of the
state and local governments. For these reasons,
we need to consider the legal provisions of
Proposition 13, and then its possible conse-
quences for various kinds of municipal debt.2
Proposition 13
Proposition 13 rolls back current taxes-both
tax rates and assessed values-on allpropertyto
I percent of 1975-76 market value. (State budget
analysts originally estimated that this would
mean an initial $7-billion, or 57-percent, reduc-
tion in California property taxes--one-third
attributable to owner-occupied homes and the
rest to rental, non-residential, and personal
properties, as well as inventories.)3 Tax rates
must then be held at the I-percent ceiling, while
assessed market values mayrise no more thanthe
annual percentage increase in the consumerprice
index or 2 percent per year, whichever is less.
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However, properties sold, traded, or newly con-
structed after 1975-76 may be reassessed at
current market values.
Proposition 13 also attempts to prevent other
taxes from rising to offset the lost property-tax
revenues. First, it requires that State-tax in-
creases be passed by a two-thirds vote of all
members (not just those voting) of both houses
of the legislature. Second, it states that property
taxes cannot be raised beyond the above limits
(even by voterapproval), and that otherlocaltax
increases must gain the approvaloftwo-thirdsof
all "qualified electors"4 in the affected municipal-
ity.
Proposition 13 specifically exempts tax in-
creases needed to service prior voter-approved
debt: "The limitation...shall not apply to ad
valorem taxes or special assessments to pay
interest and redemption charges on any indebt-
edness approved by the voters prior to the time
this section becomes effective." For this reason,
payments on debt approved by voters prior to
the effective date of Proposition 13 are not
subject to the specific tax constraints placed on
property. But payments on all new debt ap-
proved after that date, and on all priordebt not
voter-approved, would be constrained by the
tax-limitation provisions of the amendment.
From its first introduction until the June 6
election, Proposition 13's effects on the cost of
municipal debt were a function ofthe probability
ofpassage. Throughout muchofthe pre-election
period, poll results indicated probable passage.





Proposition Feb Mar27- May May Election
13 11-23 Apr 3 1-8 29-31 Results
Yes 20% 27% 42% 57% 65%
No 10 25 39 34 35
Undecided 70 48 19 9
Unaware
Sources: Field Institute surveys as reported in the San Fran-
cisco Chronicle, June 2. 1978. Election results as
reported in the California Journal. July 1978.until the last several weeks before the election,
when voters rallied behind the strong message
that Proposition 13 carried to all levels ofgov-
ernment (Table I).
Effects on types of debtS
Proposition 13's effects on the municipal-
bond market depend very much on the security
of each type of bond, as is seen below. In this
paper, State bonds aredescribed becauseoftheir
importance, but they are omitted from the em-
pirical tests because only a few such bonds were
issued during the sample period.6 To aid the
reader, Table 2 provides a summary of the
hypothesized effects for the various types of
bonds.
General-obligation bonds (state and local)





I "Existing'" debt comprises bonds that were approved prior
to July I. 1978. while "new'" debt comprises issues ap-











Aaa rating would be jeopardized at least
in transition period. Longer-term effect
depends on whether expenditures are
reduced sufficiently.
Existing I debt not affected because ofits
exemption from revenue ceiling. New
debt adversely affected unless authorized
under a non-ad-valorem special tax.
No effect on new or existing "pure'"
revenue bonds. which constitute the ma-
jority of revenue bonds. Small negative
effect on hybrid bonds with tax revenue
as backup security.
Severe negative impact on new and exist-
ing debt due to restrictions on property
tax assessments and rates.
Negative effect on non-voter approved
existing debt and on new debt because of
local government's increased difficulty in
meeting lease payments. Extent of effect
highly variable depending on whether
facility is "essential" and whether it could
generate sufficient revenue to sustain
debt service if local government failed to
meet lease payments.
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credit" or "unlimited tax" bonds, are normally
issued by state or local governments only with
prior voter approval. Debt service for G.O.'s
may be paid out ofany available revenuesource,
with the issuing authority pledging its full faith
and credit to meet such payments.
Despite the emergence of Proposition 13 and
the reduction of the large state-budget surplus,
the State of California throughout 1978 was
rated AAA by Standard and Poor's (S&P) and
Aaa by Moody's, owing largely to the state
government's fiscal conservatism and a rapidly
growing tax base. Proposition 13 conceivably
might have jeopardized the state's strong credit
rating, for several reasons: (I)a drawdown ofthe
state surplus and an increase in state expendi-
tures was required to assist local governments;
(2) increases in state tax rates henceforth will
require two-thirdsfavorable vote ofboth Houses
of the legislature; (3) state debt might be in-
creased to finance public-works projects that
otherwise would have been financed by local
G.O. issues, and (4) analysts may have believed
that Proposition 13 would have a depressing
effect on the state economy.
Over the near term, it is possible that Proposi-
tion 13 would have no adverseeffect on the safety
of state G.O. bonds, despite the expenses in-
curred as the state strives to help out local
governments. Although a two-thirds vote ofthe
legislature would permit additional taxes to pay
off debt, such use of revenues would represent
one ofmany demands for funds. Over the longer
term, the effect on state debt would depend
largely on how the state elects to run its fiscal
operation in response to local-governmentneeds
on the one hand and to voter pressures for fiscal
conservatism on the other.
Because Proposition 13 singles outad valorem
(property) taxes, local G.O. debt would be affect-
ed somewhat differently from state G.O. debt.
For "existing" voter-approved bonds (those
which received voter approval prior to July I,
1978, regardless of when they were actually
issued), debtservice would be exempted from the
I-percent tax-rateceiling imposed onadvalorem
taxes. Thus, property-tax overrides could be
employed without special voterapprovaltomeet
the payments on"existing"voter-approved debt.However, "new" G.O. debt (that approved by
voters July I orthereafter) would have tobe paid
from available revenues as constrained by Prop-
osition 13. (Any extra tax revenues would have
to be passed by a two-thirds vote of "qualified
electors," and even then, new taxes could not be
levied on property.) As a result ofthese specific
provisions, there should be no significant effect
on "existing" local G.O. bonds, but there should
be someadverse effect on"new"local G.O. debt.7
Revenue bonds (state and local)
Revenue bonds are normally issued to finance
revenue-producing facilities, and user fees are
generally pledged to pay the debt service. They
may be issued by municipalities or special dis-
tricts (such as sewer or hospital districts). The
repayment of "pure" revenue bonds does not
depend on the operating budget of the munici-
pality.s Thus, Proposition 13 would presumably
have no effect on either state or local "pure"
revenue bonds.
In some cases, municipalities pledge general
(property) tax revenues as backup security in the
event that userfees prove inadequateto coverthe
debt service. In these cases, Proposition 13
would jeopardize the quality of the backup
security. Furthermore, revenue bonds are now
sometimes used to finance the cost of self-
insurance plans such as workers'-compensation
and medical-malpractice insurance. Not being
tied to a revenue-producingfacility, these bonds
must be secured by the available revenues ofthe
municipality involved. Despite such exceptions,
revenue bonds normally are secured by the
revenues of the facility rather than by property
taxes orgeneral tax revenues ofthe municipality.
Thus, for revenue bonds in the aggregate, Propo-
sition 13 should have little orno effect on interest
cost.
Tax-allocation bonds
These "limited tax" bondsare used extensively
to finance redevelopment projects throughout
California, but are not in wide use outside the
State. They are financed and secured primarily
by the "tax increment" revenues on a specific
redevelopment project.9 Under tax-increment
financing, property values prior to the project
are "fixed" in the yearduringwhich the project is
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approved. Property-tax revenues generated by
the fixed base-year assessed value are allocated
to existing tax bodies such as a city or county.
Then, additional tax revenues from the increase
in assessed value over the fixed base-yearlevt.(l-
the tax-increment revenues-are allocated tothe
redevelopment agency. They are used to payoff
debt of the agency and to provide internal funds
for further project expansion. Redevelopment
agencies have commonly used long-term debt to
finance improvements that are sold at less than
cost. The tax-increment revenues are then used
to payoff the debt, and in this manner, they
indirectly provide for a subsidy on improve-
ments.
Because it lowers assessed values and
property-tax rates, Proposition 13 seriously af-
fects the revenue base for tax-allocationbonds. 10
And because of the heavy debt service of many
redevelopment districts,II such a severe restric-
tion on revenue could easily result in default in
many cases. Increased default risk should result
in an increase in interestcost for new issues anda
decline in the market value of outstanding
bonds.
Lease-purchase bonds
These bonds, also called lease-revenue or
lease-rental bonds, are issued by a public, private
or nonprofit leaseback corporation which uses
the proceeds to construct some facility that is
then leased to a municipal government. The
municipal government (lessee) makes rental pay-
ments to the corporation (lessor) sufficient to
pay debt service on the bonds and operating
expenses of the corporation. In general, such
obligations are not voter approved, and the
municipality normally promises to provide for
rental payments out of its operating budget.
Lease-purchase bonds aresometimes revenue-
supported to the extent that the facility's reve-
nues provide for the debt service. As with reve-
nue bonds, Proposition 13's impact depends
largely on the ability of the project, such as a
parking lot, to be self-supporting in the event
that the municipality reneges on its lease con-
tract. However, many lease-purchase bonds are
supported solely by lease payments from the
municipality's operating budget. These will be
negatively affected to the degree thatthe munici-pality's financial condition deteriorates and tax-
payers regard the facility to be a non-essential
service. Thus, the safety oflease-purchase bonds
might decline somewhat under Proposition 13,
because the municipalities might lackflexibility
to meet payments within their budgets and
taxpayers might regard continued lease pay-
ments as a non-essential expenditure.
II. Empirical Evidence
Thepreviousdiscussion suggeststhat Proposi- I). By the time oftheelection, theinterestcost on
tion I3 should have affected the interest cost of tax-allocation bonds was almost 300 basis points
some types of new issues as the election results above the Moody's Aaa rate, compared with an
grew more certain. The effects can be measured average ofroughly 50 basis points in 1977. More
by an examination ofdata on new issues oflocal important, there were no new tax-allocation
municipal debt in California sold between Janu- issues after the election. 13
ary I, 1977, and October 3, 1978 12-and specifi- Chart 1gives an informative, albeit simplistic,
cally by an analysis of the average yield spread picture of Proposition I3's effect on the cost of
between new California issues and Moody'sAaa California debt. In the remainder ofthis section,
new-issue index. The time period is divided into statistical models are used to obtain refined
three subperiods: all of 1977 (pre-Proposition measures ofthe amendment'seffect oneach kind
13); January I-June 6, 1978 (the period of of bond. In the process, it will be possible to
Proposition 13's increasingly likely victory); and quantify the extent to which Proposition-I3-
June 7-0ctober 3, 1978 (post-Proposition 13). related increases in new-issue interest cost have
Overthe first halfof 1978, and possibly begin- been associated with changes in bond ratings,
ning as earlyas December, 1977, interest spreads number of bids per issue, and other factors that
clearly increased for tax-allocation, lease- normally help to explain the interest cost.
purchase, and possibly for revenue bonds(Chart
Chart 1
Spread Between California and National New· Issue Rates'
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1 California rates are equally-weighted averages of new-issue rates in each month. National rates are
the monthly averages of Moody's weekly Aaa new issue municipal bond index.
2 Date at which Proposition 13 was placed on the ballot.
3 Date at which Proposition 13 passed.
29NIC = a + blTERMST +dlDTERMST+
d2 Aaa + d3 Aa + d4 A +ds(Baa-B)+
b2 LSIZE + b3 LBIDS + d6 NEGOT
(I)
Interest-cost model
According to earlier statistical studies, the
most important factors explaining the interest
cost of new issues ofa given categoryofbondare
the average level of municipal-bond yields na-
tionwide, and factors specific to new issues such
as quality rating, size. of issue, number ofcom-
petitive bids, and type of placement. 14 (The
alternatives to competitive biddingare negotiat-
ed sale or private placement.) A regression relat-
ingallofthesevariablesto new-issue interestcost
explains a significant portion of the variation in
interest cost from issue to issue.
Theoretically, the effects of Proposition 13
may have been transmitted through two distinct
channels. First, the amendment may have influ-
enced ratings, bids, and other characteristics,
thereby leading to a rise in interest cost. Second,
it may also have directly increased the interest
cost of new issues without necessarily changing
these other characteristics. These alternative
channels can be sorted out by fitting different
models to the data. The alternative models
developed in this section will enable us to distin-
guish between the different possible channels of
influence.
For a typical period, such as the pre-
Proposition 13 period, a model of thefollowing
specification can be used to explain the interest
cost for new issues of California bonds:
The variable TERMST represents the nation-
al interest rate on a typical municipal bond of
high qualityandcomparablematurityduringthe
week that the new issue is sold. Forthejth new-
issue, the value of TERMST can be calculated
according to the formula:
. . . In MAT j
TERMSTj = lit + (130t - lid In 30
where ilt = yield on Salomon Brothers index
for prime one-year general obliga-
tion municipal bonds during the
week that the jth issue is sold;
130t =:e,yield on Salomon Brothers index
for prime general obligation mu-
nicipal bonds of 30-year maturity;
MATj=average maturity ofthejthissue. 17
This specification ofinterest cost captures the
desirable logarithmic shape of a term-structure
model. In particular, it not only allows the entire
term structure to shift up and down, but also
allows the term structure to twist as short- and
long-term rates change relative to one another. 18
TERMSTj is then a single interest rate taken
from the term structure for week t and maturity,
MATj. An hypothesis on the coefficient, bl' of
TERMST is that bI = I, so that NIC rises and
falls with TERMST.19 For some serial issues in
the following analysis, TERMSTcannotbe used
= zero-one dummy variable
equal to one for Moody's Aa
(S&P AA ) rating;
= zero-one dummy variable
equal to one for Moody's A
(S&P A) rating;
= zero-one dummy variable
equal to one for Moody's Baa
to B (S&P BAA to B) rating
(no bonds were rated below B;
nonrated bondsarethe omitted
class);
= natural logarithm ofthe size of
the total serial issue in thou-
sands ofdollars;
= natural logarithm of the num-
ber ofbids received in competi-
tive bidding;
= dummy variable equal to zero
for competitive bidding and







= "net interest cost" (interest
rate) for the new issue;15
= variable reflecting the nation-
wide interest rate for bonds of
high quality and comparable
maturity (see explanation be-
low);
=dummy variable used when the
average maturity of the new
issue is unknown (see explana-
tion below);
= zero-one dummy variable
equal to one for Moody's Aaa






30because it requires informationonaverage matu-
rity, which is not available from published
sources. To compensate for this, the regression
sets TERMST equal to ilt and adds another
variable DTERMST, equal to (i 30t -ilt).20
The following hypotheses suggest how the
other variables would affect interest cost. The
rating variables measure the increase in interest
cost over that ofa comparable non-rated bond.
The higher the quality rating, the lower the
expected interest cost. Thus, the rating coeffi-
cients should have negative signs, although it is
not clear that a rating of(Baa-B) would carrya
lower interest cost than no rating. The effect of
issue size is ambiguous. Bond traders state that
both very small and very large issues pay a
premium-small issues because ofatendencyfor
underwriters to bid high due to the small poten-
tial payofffrom obtainingdetailed information,
and large issues because of"supplyeffects," that
is, the difficulty of reselling a large number of
bonds in large serial issues in a short span of
time. It is normally hypothesized that the num-
ber of bids reflects the degree ofcompetition in
underwriting and the importance of imperfect
information (Kessel [11]). Interest costshould be
higher the fewer the bids under competitive
bidding, and should be higher still under nego-
tiated sale or private placement.
Adding time shifts
Aside from Proposition 13's effects on ratings
and other variables, it probably also has had a
Chart 2
Model for Structural Shift
in Interest Cost
significant effect on interest cost distinct from
that felt through the other variables. Itis reason-
able to hypothesize that as the amendment's
prospects became increasingly strong with the
approach of the election (Table 1), its effect on
interest cost would have increased. Then, the
certainty after June 6shouldhave hada constant
effect.
Given data limitations, it is best to hypothe-
size a linear trend for the pre-election 1978
period. In addition, a linear trend for 1977 and
an intercept shift for the first week in January,
1978, are introduced to test whether or not the
shift in 1977 was zero as hypothesized, and
whether there was any intercept shift in 1978.
The full model with structural time shift now
becomes (see Chart 2):
NIC = a + bITERMST + dl DTERMST+
"d2Aaa + d3Aa + d4 A + ds (Baa-B) +
b2LSIZE + b3LBIDS + d6NEGOT +
b4WEEK77 + d7DJAN78 +
bsWEEK78 + d gDJUN78 (2)
where
WEEK77 = linear time trend for the weeks in
1977;
DJAN78 = intercept shiftdummy,datedJanu-
ary 1, 1978 (week 53);
WEEK *8= linear time trend. for the period
January I-June 6, 1978 (weeks 53-'
74);
DJUN78 = intercept shift dummy, dated June
6, 1978 (week 75).
The hypothesized signs for the effects on each
type of bond are:
General Tax Lease
Obligation Revenue Allocation Purchase
WEEK77 0 0 0 0
DJAN78 0 0 lJ 0
WEEK78 0 0 + +






Because ratings and other issue descriptors
might have been affected by Proposition/I3,
equation (2) should also be estimated with right-
hand variables that are not subject to possible
endogeneity. For this purpose, the following
model serves as an alternatemeasureofProposi-
tion 13's effects:*Two in January and one on March 6.
NIC = a + blTERMST+dlDTERMST+
b4 WEEK77 +d7DJAN78 +
bsWEEK78 + dgDJUN78 (3)
This equation would attribute entirely to
Proposition 13 those changes in 1978 netinterest
cost which are not related to changes in open-
market rates. Equation (3) would essentially
estimate the time-shifts apparent in Chart 1.
Changes in issue descriptors
Although ratings, size of issue, number of
bids, and type of offering cannot be considered
exogenous to Proposition 13 on a priori
grounds, in fact, significant shifts in values were
found ex post only for tax-allocation bonds.
Between 1977 and 1978, therewere no significant
shifts in ratings for general-obligation, revenue,
and lease-purchase bonds, but there were shifts
for tax-allocation bonds significant at the 5-
percent level. 23 The following distribution of
ratings for tax-allocation bonds indicates that
the ratings deteriorated.
Regression results26
General-obligation bonds. Although no
Proposition-13 effects were hypothesized for
G.O. bonds, the results in Table 3 suggest that
there might have been a slight impactpriortothe
June election. (Chart 1 suggests the same result,
with some increaseinratesin the monthofMay.)
Equation (2) in Table 3 shows a significant
downward shift in interest cost in Januaryl978
of 38 basis points, and an insignificant increase
of 1.6 basis points per week until the June
election. When ratings and other descriptors are
excluded (equation (3», the time effects and the
t-statistics are larger. However, the net effect of
the 57 basis-point decline in Januaryand the 3.5
basis-point rise per week thereafter was still only
20 basis points by the time of the election,27
These effects may have been the result ofPropo-
sition 13, but they appearto have been small and
short-lived. As yet, there has been no post-
election effect on general-obligation issues.28
Revenue bonds. These bonds experienced a
significant downward drift in interest cost of 1.1
basis points per week in 1977. This unexplain-
able anomaly appears to be unrelated to Propo-
sition 13 and to haveended well before theend of
1977 (see Chart 1). Otherwise there were no
significant time-shift effects,with the exception
ofa significant upward shift of 71 basis points in
equation (3) at the time of the June 6 election.
There was also an upward shift in June using
equation (2), although it was smaller and insig-
nificant. Detailed examination of the residuals
and of\the underlying data suggests that the
mark~t\ began distinguishing "pure" revenue
bondSfrom those of a hybrid nature (as dis-
cussed earlier), and that higher rates on some
hybrid bonds in the sample may have resulted in
a post-election upward shift of perhaps 70 basis
points.29 However, without more data and grea-
ter detail on each issue, this result cannot be
demonstrated rigorously.
Tax-allocation bonds. The time shifts for tax-
allocation bonds are largeand highly significant.
Interest costs rose at a rate of 13.5 to 14.2 basis
points per weekover the early 1978 period. They
were 263 to308 basis points higherby the week of
the election as a result ofthe amendment. How-
ever, because of the unexpected negative coeffi-




















On April 11, 1978, Moody's suspended its
ratings on all previously-rated California tax-
allocationbonds(64 outstandingissues, ofwhich
31 had been rated A and 33 Baa or Baa-l).24
Duringthe same week, Standard and Poor'ssaid
that, in the event of Proposition 13's passage, it
would assess the impact on existing ratings ofall
California bonds.25
There was also a significant shift to fewer bids
and to larger size per issue for tax-allocation
bonds, but no significant changes for other cate-
gories. As the June 6 election approached, tax-
allocation issues generally received only one bid,
and during the six weeks immediately prior to
that date, several issues received no bids and
were retracted. Since June 6, no tax allocation
bonds have been issued.
32Table 3
Regressions for Net Interest Cost
General Obligation Revenue Tax Allocation Lease-Purchase
Eq. (2) Eq. (3) Eq. (2) Eq. (3) Eq. (2) Eq. (3) Eq. (2) Eq. (3)
CONSTANT .00 .66 1.71 1.27 6.46 7.34 2.32 2.17
(.00) (1.09) (2.67)* (1.80)* (7.15)* (7.83)* (1.67)* (1.29)
TERMST 1.19 .99 .94 .92 ~.341 ~·.251 .74 .66
(1.71)* (-.05) (-.50) (-.60) (-7.06)* (--6.40)* (-.96) (-1.01)
DTERMST .87 .86 .74 .79 -.40 .35 .58 .78
(.09)2 (.10)2 (.11)2 (.13)2 (.14)2 (.16)2 (.23)2 (.28)2
Aaa -.60 -.97 -.22' -1.39
(3.25)* (-2.32)* (-.59) (-4.77)*
Aa -53 -.27 -054 -1.34
(-3.00)* (-1.22) (-.11) (-4,69)*
A -.48 -.19 -.37 -.99
(-5.15)* (-1.14) (-1.82)* (-4.32)*
Baa-B -.01 .12 -.25 -.51
(-.13) (.65) (-1.41) (-2.18)*
LSIZE .026 -.028 .250 .062
(.93) (-.71) (4.53)* (.97)
LBIDS -.14 -.16 -.44 .11
(-2.62)* (-1.87)* (4.02)* (-.87)
NEGOT .28 .10 .18
(.96) (.17) (.67)
WEEK77 -.000 .001 -.011 .011 -.008 -.006 .007 .007
(-.08) (.27) (-2.36)* 1.97)* ( 1.40) (-.97) (1.42) (1.20)
DJAN78 -.38 -.57 .28 .31 -.34 -.04 -.39 .77
(-2.18)* (-2.81)* (.98) (.98) (-1.05) (.10) ('--1.60) (-2.47)*
WEEK78 .016 .035 .001 -.009 .135 .142 .037 .083
(1.52) (2.89)* (.02) (-.37) (7.58)* (7.00)* (2.01)* (3.61)*
DJUN78 -.19 -.20 .43 .71 .344 -.334
1.22) (-1.12) (1.26) (1.85)* (.92) (-.69)
R-Squared .56 .40 .70 .59 .79 .71 .66 .40
Standard Error .42 .50 .35 .42 .57 .67 .40 .53
Number of Observations
(Total) 158 158 58 58 88 88 63 63
(Jan-June 6, 1978) 48 48 II II 35 35 19 19
(June 7-Sept 1978) 22 22 13 13 0 0 2 2
* Significant at the 5 percent level for one-tailed test. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics against a nul! hypothesisofzero
except for the coefficient of TERMST for which the nul! hypothesis is one.
I t-statistics for TERMST against Ho:O are 1.30 and -1.81 respectively. 4 Estimated based on only two observations.
For DTERMST, the figure in parenthesis is the standard error. Insufficient data for estimation. , Estimate based on only three observations.
33the time shift may be overstated.30 Adjusting for
the contradictory term-structure relationship, it
is reasonable to conclude that the effect on tax
allocation bonds was at least 250 basis points by
the time of election. Indeed, this figure may be
highly conservative, because (I) several issues
were retracted when unsold priorto theelection;
(2) other issues probably carried high yields, but
were not reported in the Bond Buyer because
they were sold through negotiation or private
placement; and (3) no new issues have come to
market since the election.
Lease-purchase bonds. As hypothesized,
lease-purchase bonds were also adversely affect-
ed by Proposition 13. In equation (2), the time-
shift accounted for a 43 to 81 basis-pointincrease
in interest cost by the time of the election,
depending on whether or not the insignificant
dummy for January 1978 is included. In equa-
tion (3), the pre-election shift amounted to 106
basis points. A comparison ofthe coefficients in
equations (2) and (3) indicates that some of
Proposition 13's effect was experienced through
changes in ratings, despite the fact that the tests
described earlier did not find any such rating
change. The large negative coefficientsfor higher
ratings in equation (2) would help to explain a
rise in net interest cost even with a minor down-
grading ofratings. Since the election, there have
been only two lease-purchase issues (rated A-I
and A by Moody's), and net interest costs have
declined from their peak in May 1978 (see Chart
I). According to one bond trader, rates on these
issues should decline further because most city-
and-county governments have been able to ad-
just more smoothly to Proposition 13 than was
initially thought possible. Overall, the rate on
lease-purchase bonds was affected by more than
75 basis points by the time ofthe election, with
some subsequent decline.
Channels of effects
The effects ofProposition 13 canbe quantified
further by using equation (2) in Table 3 to trace
through the various channels that account for
the change in net interest cost between 1977 and
the "post-election" period.3l Table4decomposes
the shifts in net interest cost for each bond
category into those related to changes in right-
hand variables. It does nottell us whichchannels
are statistically significant, but indicates how
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much of the change in net interest cost was
channeled through the 1978 time-shift parame-
tersand how much was channeled through
changes in ratings and other descriptors.
The change in net interest cost for general-
obligation bonds, which is only 16 basis points,
can be related to term-structure variables. The
change for revenue bonds is greater (79 basis
points) and is matched by a 1978 time shift
almost as great. The rise in interest cost for tax-
allocation bonds (262 basis points) is more than
explained by the combined286 basis-pointeffect
of 1978 time shift and changes in ratings, issue
size, and number of bids. Ofthe 139 basis-point
rise for lease-purchase bonds, 49 basis points
were felt through the 1978 time shift and 15
Table 4
Shift in Mean of Dependent
Variable Attributable to Changes
in Right-Hand Variables Between
1977 and Post-Election1 Period
(Expressed in basis points)
General Tax Lease-
Obligation Revenue Allocation Purchase
Net Interest Cost
Change in Actual
Means 16 79 262 139
Change in Means
of Estimates 15 81 255 120
Right-Hand Variables
Term Structure 20 33 -10 39
Time Shift 19772 0 -36 -21 15
Time Shift 19783 -22 73 235 49
Ratings 9 I 8 15
Other Descriptors 8 10 '434 2
I For general obligation and revenue bonds. the post-
election period is used (i.e., all issues afterJune 6). Because
there were no issues of tax allocation bonds and only 2
issues of lease-purchase bonds in the post-election period,
all issues after May I, 1978, were used as the "post-
election" period for these categories.
Effect of WEEK77 only.
3 Combined effects of intercept shift variables and
WEEK78.
4 Larger issue size accounts for 20 basis points and fewer
bids per issue for 23 basis points.
Source: Calculated using estimates for equation (2) in Table
3and means ofright-hand variables for the two sub-
periods. In order for the components to sum to
totals, both significant and insignificant variables
were included.through changes in ratings.32 Altogether,
changes in ratings accounted for only a small
portion of the increase in net interest cost for
those bonds significantly affected.
III. Implications.for the Value of Outstanding Debt
Inferences regarding Proposition 13's impact
on the value of existing state-and-local debt
ideally should be derived from secondary-
market yield data for actively traded issues.
However, such data are not available, so.that
inferences aredrawn here fromthe effect on new-
issue yield cost. Most existing Californiadebt is
in the form of general-obligation and revenue
bondS (Table 5). On the basis ofour findings in
the empirical section, we canpresume that Prop-
osition 13 has had no effect on the $7.3 billion of
existing local general-obligation bonds, perhaps
some effect on the $5.5 billion in revenue bonds,
and a definite effect on the $576 million of tax-
allocation and $2.2 billion of lease-purchase
bonds.
To measure the effect on the present value of
outstanding debt, we can calculate the impact of
the rise in new-issue interest cost on the present
value of a bond ofcomparable maturity. In the
post-election period, theaverage net interestcost
of new revenue-bond issues was 7.07 percent,
with perhaps 70 basis points of the interest-cost
rise due to Proposition 13. For tax-allocation
bonds in May 1978 (the last date any were
issued), average interest cost was 8.45 percent
and at least 250 basis points ofthe rise was due to
Proposition 13. For lease-purchase bonds, the
average rate (May-September 1978) was 7.17
percent, with at least 75 basis points resulting
from Proposition 13.
For these three categories of bonds, average
maturities (the averages of the "average maturi-
ties" of the serial issues) ranged from 12 to 15
years. If we assume 14-year bonds with equal
payments at the end of each year, the Proposi-
tion .13 reductions in present value are 9 percent,
28 percent, and 9 percent for revenue, tax-
allocation, and lease-purchase bonds respective-
ly.33 Ifwe apply these figures to the outstanding
debtshown in Table 5, bond values are reduced
by $500 million for revenue bonds, $160 million
for tax-allocation bonds and $195 million for
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lease-purchase bonds. It should be stressed,
however, that (1) the effect (if any) on revenue
bonds is probably.concentrated amon&. those
bonds that are not fully user-fee supported, (2)
the effect on revenue bonds and lease-purchase
bonds may diminish with time as local govern-
ments adjust more fully to the post-Proposition
13 environment, and (3) the effect on tax-






Obligation Revenue Allocation Purchase Other
City $1.097 $2.757 $ 0 $ 826 $ 5932
County 109 8 0 1.143 1482
School
District 2.235 253 0 N.A. 2,1033
Special
District 3.852 2.519 576 194 1.1064
Total
Local $7.293 $5.537 $ 576 $2.163 $3,950
State $5.589 $1.I48 0 N.A. N.A.
I Figures for local debt are ofthe fiscal year endingJune30,
1977.
Figures for State debt arc as of December 31, 1977.
Mostly special assessment and improvement district debt.
, Loans from the State and Public School Building Funds.
4 $566 related to constructionfinanced by theStateand U.S.
Government. $11 in time warrants. and $529 in "other
long-term indebtedness."
Sources: Staff of the Assembly Committees on Local Gov-
ernment and Revenue and Taxation, [3J. p. 347.
Legislative Analyst [2]. and annual reports of the
California State Controller on financial transac-
tions concerning cities. counties. and school dis-
tricts. 1976-77.IV. Summary and Conclusions
Proposition 13 brought on a sudden and
severe reductioninlocal-government revenues in
California, with all ofthe reduction in the form
of property-tax relief. Although the State has
provided substantial assistance to local govern-
ments, restrictions on new taxes have reduced
theirexpected income, thereby reducingthe reve-
nue flows needed to payofftheir existing debt.
This study has shown the resulting effects on the
cost ofnew debtand the implicationsforexisting
debt.
Proposition 13 apparently has had no signifi-
cant effect on local general-obligation bonds
approved prior to July 1, 1978, except for per-
haps some minor impact on new issues sold just
prior to the election. The effect apparently has
been nil for "pure" revenue bonds butsignificant
for hybrid revenue bonds, so that the average
cost of all such bonds issued since the election
increased by approximately 70 basis points.
There has also been an adverse effect ofat least
75 basis points on lease-purchase bonds. For
both the hybrid revenue and lease-purchase
categories, however, the rise in the risk premium
may now be declining, in view oftheexistence of
state-government aid and theadaptationoflocal
governments to the post-Proposition 13 environ-
ment. In contrast, tax-allocation issues have
suffered an increase in risk premium ofat least
250 basis points, and there is no indication that
this premium will necessarily decline. Redevel-
opment agencies, the principal issuers of such
bonds,thus appear to have been the principal
debt-market casualties ofProposition 13. Atthis
point, the .constraints on property-tax revenues
have·ended tax-allocation bonds as a viable
sourceoffunding for redevelopment agencies.
Thefindihgs of this study imply that restric-
tions on the size of government, if properly
structured, need notincrease the cost ofnew debt
or decrease the value of existing debt to any
significant extent. Funds needed to payoff all
existing debt could be exempted from revenue
ceilings(as was voter-approveddebt under Prop-
osition 13), thereby lessening the effect on exist-
ing debt. Alternatively, restrictions could be
placed on government expenditures rather than
revenues, thereby protecting all debt. Voters and
government officials may wish to consider such
alternatives in structuring ways to restrict gov-
ernment. In the meantime, municipal-bond in-
vestors should keep a wary eye on what the
voters are saying.
FOOTNOTES
1. As used throughoutthe paper, the term municipality
includes the state, all levels of local government, and
special districts.
2. On the ballotofJune6, 1978, there wereactuallytwo
competing tax-reduction alternatives-Propositions13
and 8. Defeat ofProposition 13and passage ofProposi-
tion 8 would have put in force a legislativeactknown as
the Behr Bill. This author previously hypothesized the
effects of both Proposition 13 and the Behr Bill on
California municipal debt. In all cases, hypothesized
effects were directionally the same for the two mea-
sures, although those of the Behr Bill were much
weaker. Because of the eventual passage of Proposi-
tion 13, discussion of the Behr Bill has been omitted
from this paper.
3. The $7-billion reduction h.as turned out to be an
overstatement, because of subsequent upward reas-
sessments of market values for the 1975-76 year. See
the article by William Oakland'in this issue of the Re-
view.
4. The meaning ofthe term "qualified electors"has yet
tobe determined in thecourts. It is notknown whetherit
will be interpreted as those voting or as those qualified
to vote.
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5.. This section draws heavily from the Legislative
Analyst [2J, California Assembly Staff Report [3J and
Friedlander [4Jand [5].
6. Because there were very few new issues, local
assessment bonds have also been excluded from the
discussion. There should be no effect on 1911 Act
assessment bonds and only minor effects on 1915 Act
assessment bonds, for which municipal revenues pro-
vide backup security.
7.ln the opinion of legislative analysts [2, p. 338], it
would be possibleforthestate legislatureto authorizea
new category of non-ad valorem "special tax" for the
purpose of financing capital expenditures. In this in-
stance local governmentscould issue, with atwo-thirds
approval of "qualified electors," G.O. bonds to be
repaid from the special tax which would fall outsidethe
revenue limitation of Proposition 13.
8. Although not legally obligated, local governments
have sometimes subsidized pure revenue bonds in
order to avoid default, since such action would streng-
then the government's ability to float future issues. In
such cases, pure revenue bonds could be affected by
Proposition 13.9. In manycases, governmentloansand grants,as well
as fees from facilities such as parking garages, provide
additional revenue.
10. Property that changes hands or is newly construct-
ed after 1975-76 would be assessed at current market
value.. An unresolved question is whether the fixed
base-year assessed value for a project approved after
1975-76 would be rolled back as well. Ifso, Proposition
13 Would lower the base-year assessed value, which
would reduce revenue to the local taxing bodies and
increase tax=increment revenues. By itself, this effect
would strengthen tax-allocation bonds, although it
would surely be outweighed by the negative effects of
the Proposition's constraints.
11. There are a few exceptions where the redevelop-
ment district has little debt and considerable non-
property-tax income.
12. Secondary-market yield data for municipal bonds
are too scant for statistical analysis. New-issue data for
January1,1977, through March 31,1978, wereobtained
through the Public Securities Association in New York
City and the Municipal Finance Study Group at State
University of New York at Albany. They are derived
principally from the BondBuyerNew IssueWorksheets
and the Daily Bond Buyer. Data after March 31, 1978,
were taken directly from the Daily Bond Buyer. Issues
that did not report net interest cost were deleted. These
were usually negotiated or private-placement issues.
13. This author has not been able to determine the
effect of legal restrictions on interest-rate ceilings. The
figure of 8 percent is often cited as a rate limit for
California debt,.but this limit must not be effective for
many redevelopment districts, as 15 of the 18 tax-
allocation issues after April 18, 1978, had rates in
excess of 8 percent. Three were as high as 9.7 percent.
14. See in particular, Hendershott and Kidwell [7],
Kessel [11], Kidwell [13], Tanner [16]. Variables are
omitted from thisanalysis, as theyare in otherempirical
analyses. Differences in coupon patterns would affect
the interest differential, as would the whole term struc-
ture of interest rates, because coupons are expected to
provide future reinvestment income at rates implied by
the whole term structure. Tax effects should also be
included, even for municipal bonds, because capital
gains/losses have tax effects. Also, probability func-
tions for default and call should be included. The state
of the art and limitations of the data preclude much
headway in including these variables. For evidence on
call privileges, see Kidwell [13].
15. In the municipal-bond market, bonds are almost
always sold to underwriters in a package known as a
serial issue. A serial issue will have many .bonds with
different coupons and maturities, and for the package
an "average maturity" and "net interest cost" (average
interest ratel will be calculated. Average maturity, is a
simple weighted-average of the maturities of the indi-
vidual bonds in the issue. Net interest cost is a
weighted-average of coupon yields of the different
bonds in the issue without regard to when the coupons
are paid. Thus, future coupons are implicitlydiscount-
ed at azero rate of interest, and coupons in thefirstyear
are given the same weight as thosein the lastyear. Ifthe
coupons imply rates on the par-value bonds that differ
markedly from the rates in the reoffer yields or in the
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mUnicipal-i:)ond term structure, then net interest cost
can differ markedly from the true economic interest
cost. In California, constraints placed on the underwri-
ters byttJe municipalities keep the coupon yields fairly
well in linewith the term structure. Thus, net interest
costuseqin this study is afairlycloseapproximationto
true interest cost. For a full discussion, see Hopewell
aog Kaufman [8], [9],and [10], and Mendelowitz and
Rockoff [14].
16. A single rating was used for each bond. Either
Moody's orStandard and Poor's was used ifoniyoneof
the two organizations rated the bond. Ifboth did and
there was a discrepancy, Moody's rating was used.
17. It is necessary that MATj2:1, which holds for the
sample in this paper.
18. The specification grew outofause ofterm structure
in apaperbyHendershottand Kidwell [7].Theirspecifi-
cation was different, as it was designed to pick up a
different effect of term structure on NIC.
19. The risk differential is assumed to be independentof
the level ofrates. Thisassumption is commonlyaccept-
ed, although there may be some reason to believe that
the risk premium is positively related to rates. For this
argument, see Kessel's development of Hicks' theory
[11], pp. 724 and 731.
20. When average maturityisknown, DTERMSTiszero.
When average maturity is not known, TERMST is set
equal to ht and DTERMST is set equal to (i3Ot-htL The
coefficient of DTERMST, d1, is
d1 =b1x In MAT
In 30
where In MAT is an estimate of the average of the log
average maturities for the missing data. Using In MAT
for the data with known values and b1 from the regres-
sion, one can calculate an hypothesized value for d1.
The hypothesis would merely test whether or not the
average maturity of the data with missing values was
the same as that for data with known maturities.
21. There is considerable random variation in NIC
across issues, and they are not issued uniformly over
time.
22. There is some ambiguity about general-obligation
bonds issued after July 1, 1978. Proposition 13 states
that G.O.'s approved after its implementation (July 1)
would be subject to property-tax ceilings. However, in
those few cases wherethe authorwas able tocheck, the
bonds issued were all approved prior to July 1 (one as
early as 1973).
23. The Chi-Square test was used to testwhetherornot
the 1977 and 1978 distributions came from the same
underlying population.
24. los Angeles Times, April 12, 1978, and Moody's
Bond Survey, Vol. 70, No. 16, April 13, 1978, pp. 1339-
1341.
25. On June 8, sap suspended ratings on all but voter-
approved, full faith and credit general obligations,
insured bonds, revenue bonds 1DO-percent enterprise
supported, pre-refunded bonds fUlly secured by U.S.
government obligations, and institutionally-supportedrevenue bonds. In all, ratings on 248 existing lease-
purchase, tax-allocation, special-assessment, and
hybrid-revenue issues were suspended "due to lack of
sufficient information regarding the action to be taken
by the various •levels of California government in re-
sponse to the passage of the Jarvis-Gann Initiative."
(Standard and Poor's release, June 8, 1978l. Moody's
contil)ued to rate lease-purchase bonds, and the two
post-election issues were rated A and A-1.
26. Asa test for stability ofcoefficientvalues and mode!
structure, equation (1 )-including a time trend for
WEEK77.......was Jitted for 1$77, and the results were
tested against those of equation (2) for 1977-78. The
coefficients and the standard errors were generally
found to be robust with respect to the time period
tested. Also, predictions were made for the post-
election period using equation (1) fitted to 1977 data.
The post-election prediction errors were close to the
time-shift estimates of equations (2) and (3) fitted to
1977-78 data.
27.Thefigureof20 basis points is calculated, usingthe
coefficients in Table 3a and allowing for the fact that
WEEK78 had a duration of 22 weeks:
3.5 x 22 - 57 = 20.
28. In a previous section of the paper, an effect on
general-obligation bonds approved after July 1, 1978,
was hypothesized. It appears that the G.O. bonds in the
sample either were approved prior to July 1, 1978, or
were one-year tax anticipation notes that did not re-
quire specific voter approval.
29. Redevelopment districts began to issue mortgage-
bllckedrevenuebondsaftertheelection, whereas none
wereisSUedpriorto the election. (Tax allocation debt
wasissuedinsteadJ These bonds have had net interest
cost.Ssomewhat. higher than the average for post-
election revenue bonds.
3Q.ThecoefficientonTERMSTshould be approximate-
Iyequal to one. This result holds for the other three
categories of bonds. However, for all regressions run
onlllxll"ocation bonds, the coefficient was zero or
slightlynegative. This result occurred even forequation
(1) fitted to 1977 data.
3t.Becauseoflack ofsufficient data, issues dated May
1, 1978, and thereafter are used to represent the post-
election period for tax-allocation and lease-purchase
bonds.
32. Forlease-purchase bonds, equation (2) understates
the effect of Proposition 13. As mentioned earlier,
equation (3) .gives a more accurate estimate. Using
equation (1) estimated on 1977 data, the predicted
effect ofproposition 13 in the "post-election" period
(after May 1) was found to be 77 basis points.
33. The effect on present value of an individual bond
would differ from these figures, depending on the
maturity of the bond and the probability function for
expected default.
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